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Exceptions: How Broad A Scope?
State v. Beam, 206 Neb. 248, 292 N.W.2d 302 (1980).
L INTRODUCTION
The residual hearsay exceptions contained in the Nebraska
Rules of Evidence, sections 27-803(22) and 27-804(2) (e) of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes,' allow the trial court, under certain cir-
cumstances, to admit hearsay evidence which does not fall within
any of the traditional hearsay exceptions.2 These two "catch-all"
provisions, which follow nearly verbatim their counterparts in the
Federal Rules of Evidence,3 include as admissible hearsay, state-
ments "not specifically covered by any of the [listed] exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness."
4
Section 27-804(2) (e) applies to situations in which the declarant
is unavailable as a witness, while section 27-803(22) is applicable
even though the declarant is available to testify. However, be-
cause identical language appears in both sections, the appropriate
1. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Reissue 1979). Both sections define
as admissible hearsay:
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact, (b) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (c) the gen-
eral purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. A statement
may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to pre-
pare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particu-
lars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
2. For a discussion of hearsay and its common law exceptions, see C. MCCOR-
MICK, McCoRmIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 579-751 (2d ed.
1972); 5 & 6 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1360-1810 (J. Chadbourn
rev. 1974).
3. FED. R. EvI. 803(24), 804(b) (5).
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22),--804(2)(e) (Reissue 1979).
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scope afforded the residual exceptions should be based upon the
same considerations, without regard to the declarant's availability.
Admissibility of hearsay under the residual exceptions requires
five findings by the trial court:5 (1) the statement to be admitted
must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness";6 (2) the statement must be offered "as evidence of a mate-
rial fact";7 (3) the statement must be "more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts";8 4) the proponent of
the statement must demonstrate that the "general purposes of the
rules and the interests of justice will be served" 9 by admission of
the evidence; and (5) the proponent must give the opposition no-
5. The Nebraska Supreme Court held in State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800, 807, 272
N.W.2d 759, 763 (1978) that the trial court must affirmatively find that the con-
ditions precedent set forth in the residual exceptions are met prior to the
admission of hearsay testimony under those provisions. Accord, United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d
1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Iaconetti,
540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). See 4 J. WEnq-
sTEiN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-290 (1979).
6. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Re-
issue 1979). See United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1980); Fong v.
American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weis-
man, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v.
Atkins, 618 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 992 (1980); Huff v. White Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286
(7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 821 (1980); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1045 (1980); United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bailey,
581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977); State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800, 272 N.W.2d 759 (1978).
7. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Re-
issue 1979). See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F.
Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977); State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800, 272 N.W.2d 759 (1978).
This requirement may only mean that all evidence must be relevant to be
admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 401; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-401 (Reissue 1979).
8. FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b) (5); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Re-
issue 1979). See DeMars v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 610 F.2d 55 (1st
Cir. 1979); United States v. Fredericks, 599 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977);
United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977); State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800, 272 N.W.2d 759 (1978).
9. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Re-
issue 1979). See United States v. Anderson, 618 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Toney,
599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
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tice of "his intention to offer the statement."'0
Although all five requirements of the residual exceptions under
the Federal Rules of Evidence have been litigated," most of the
controversy has focused on what constitutes the "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."'1 2 This was the pri-
mary issue presented in State v. Beam,13 which marked one of the
first attempts by the Nebraska Supreme Court to delineate the
scope of the residual exceptions.14 This Note will examine Beam
in light of the history of the residual exceptions under the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the construction given the provisions by
U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800, 272 N.W.2d 759 (1978).
10. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b) (5); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Re-
issue 1979). The Nebraska Supreme Court strictly construed the notice re-
quirement in State v. Leisy, 207 Neb. 118, 295 N.W.2d 715 (1980) and State v.
Reed, 201 Neb. 800,272 N.W.2d 759 (1978) to require a finding by the trial court
that notice was given by the proponent of his intention to offer hearsay evi-
dence under the residual exceptions. Accord, United States v. Mandel, 591
F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), affid en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978). But see Furtado v. Bishop, 604
F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980) (trial court, believing
notice requirement discretionary, admitted hearsay affidavit in a prisoner's
civil rights action even though formal notice was not given to opposing coun-
sel); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978) (affidavit admitted
in a prosecution for tax fraud absent notice to the opposition); Muncie Avia-
tion Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975) (FAA advisory
circulars concerning airplane safety admitted absent any notice).
11. See cases cited in notes 5-10 supra.
12. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b) (5). See cases cited in note 6 supra.
13. 206 Neb. 248, 254, 292 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1980).
14. The Nebraska Supreme Court's only other examination of the residual excep-
tions at the time Beam was decided had been in State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800,
272 N.W.2d 759 (1978). In Reed, the defendant was convicted of maliciously
shooting with intent to kill, wound, or maim an Omaha, Nebraska police of-
ficer. Id. at 801, 272 N.W.2d at 760. On appeal, the defendant alleged as error
the admission of hearsay testimony regarding a statement made to an inves-
tigating police officer by a young child at the scene of the shooting to the
effect that the defendant Reed knew that the police officers were outside his
apartment and that he had no intention of coming out. Id. This statement by
the child was contrary to the defendant's claim that he did not know the po-
lice were outside, but rather thought them to be a neighbor whom the defend-
ant believed was out to take his life. Id. at 804, 272 N.W.2d at 762. In holding
that the child's statement had circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
the court emphasized that the statement was "clearly spontaneous" and that
the child had personal knowledge since he lived in the same apartment as the
defendant Reed. Id. at 807, 272 N.W.2d at 763.
After Beam, the court examined the residual exceptions in State v. Leisy,
207 Neb. 118, 295 N.W.2d 715 (1980), and held that the conditions precedent to
the implementation of the residual exceptions are mandatory. Id. at 68-69,
295 N.W.2d at 723. Because the defendant had given no notice of his intention
to introduce evidence under the residual exceptions, the court affirmed the
rejection of the hearsay testimony by the trial court. Id.
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various courts and legal writers. It will conclude by suggesting the
proper application of the residual exceptions and by highlighting
the factors which need to be emphasized in reaching such a
determination.
H. THE BEAM DECISION
A. The Facts
On January 15, 1979, the 911 emergency division in Omaha re-
ceived a telephone message in which the caller stated: "I shot my
wife... 3817 Monroe ... get here fast.., my wife is dying."15
When two uniformed police officers arrived on the scene the de-
fendant refused to let them enter.16 Later, the defendant opened
the door and stated: "You guys are too late. I have already shot
my wife. You can't help me and you can't help her because she is
already dead."17 Upon entering the Beam residence, the police
and rescue squad personnel found the defendant's wife lying on
the kitchen floor.18 A .22 caliber revolver containing six empty car-
tridge casings was located near the defendant's wife, and the floor
on which she lay had been pierced by five bullet holes.19 The res-
cue personnel quickly affirmed the defendant's belief that his wife
was dead.20 The defendant was arrested and charged with second-
degree murder.21
At trial, the defendant testified that on the day of the shooting
he had noticed that the revolver was absent from the locked gun
case where it was customarily kept.22 He asked his wife to bring
him the gun and she did.23 He then testified that an argument en-
sued while he was standing near the kitchen table with the re-
volver and his wife was seated at the table.24 His wife reached for
the gun, and the contact caused it to discharge accidentally into
her head.25 The defendant recalled only one shot being fired but





20. Upon examination, the rescue personnel found that the defendant's wife had
no vital signs of respiration or pulse and an electrocardiogram reflected ter-
minal heart rhythm. Brief of Appellant at 6-7, State v. Beam, 206 Neb. 248,292
N.W.2d 302 (1980). The body had brain matter protruding from the top of the
skull and a later autopsy established the cause of death as a bullet wound in
the top of the head. 206 Neb. at 249, 292 N.W.2d at 303-04.
21. Brief of Appellant at 2.
22. 206 Neb. at 250, 292 N.W.2d at 304.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. A police weapons expert examined the revolver and testified at trial that it
1982] RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 191
"conceded that he did not remember the events too well because
he had had a great deal to drink."
26
The defendant had filed a motion in limine prior to trial in an
effort to exclude from admission anticipated hearsay statements
made by his wife to various individuals.27 This motion was granted
as to several witnesses but was denied with respect to Sally Rau,
Melvin Barnes, and Ellen Primeau.28 These three persons testified
at trial.
Sally Rau, an attorney, testified that she met with the decedent
on December 13, 1978, and discussed decedent's desire to file for a
divorce.29 During this meeting, the attorney observed that the de-
cedent was bruised on both arms and took a photograph of the
bruises which was later received as evidence at trial.30 She testi-
fied that Mrs. Beam informed her that the bruises were the result
of a beating by her husband the previous night and that there were
several weapons at her residence.
31
Melvin Barnes, a Sarpy County Deputy Sheriff, testified that at
1:30 a.m. on January 13, 1979, he was on duty and investigated a
truck he observed in a church parking lot.32 He discovered defend-
ant's wife alone in the truck and found that she had been crying.33
He testified that she told him "she and her husband had had a fight
and he had beaten her up."34 The decedent had no cash and the
deputy sheriff took her to a motel and arranged for her to secure a
room by check.3 5 The motel registration and the check receipt
were admitted into evidence at trial.36
was a single action weapon requiring the hammer to be fully cocked before it
would fire. Id. at 249-50, 292 N.W.2d at 304. His tests showed that the only way
the revolver would fire without pulling the trigger was to strike the hammer
of the gun very hard with a brass mallet. Id. at 250, 292 N.W.2d at 304. The
defendant introduced testimony of a retired gunsmith and ballistic engineer
who had tested the revolver and found it to be defective. He testified that the
weapon would discharge accidentally more often than not and would do so
consistently when an effort was made to pull the gun from the hand of a per-
son holding it. Id. However, defendant's witness admitted on cross-examina-
tion that the gun's defective condition could have been caused by the earlier














Ellen Primeau was a coworker and friend of the decedent.3 7
She testified that during the two-week period before the shooting,
the decedent told her she had consulted an attorney and was going
to divorce her husband.38
The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder
and the district judge sentenced him to fifteen years' imprison-
ment.3 9 On appeal, "[t]he defendant's assignments of error all
center[ed] on the contention that the admission of the hearsay
testimony of Sally Rau, Melvin Barnes, and Ellen Primeau violated
the hearsay rule and its exceptions as set out in the Nebraska stat-
utes, and constituted prejudicial error."40 The defendant also as-
serted that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated his
right to confront witnesses under the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution.41
B. The Supreme Court Decision
After noting that the testimony of the three witnesses was hear-
say, inadmissible unless it fell within an exception to the hearsay
rule,42 the Nebraska Supreme Court focused on whether the
residual exceptions would provide the basis for admissibility. The
court initially determined that the procedural notice requirements
had been satisfied 43 and "that the statements were offered as evi-
dence of a material fact"4 and had the requisite probative value.45
The court then examined "[t] he critical issue ... [of] whether the
circumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay statements
by the decedent provided guarantees of trustworthiness compara-
ble to the other specific [hearsay] exceptions," 46 i.e., whether
there were "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."47 In making its examination, the court emphasized the ele-
ment of corroboration, stating: "'[W]hen hearsay seems to the
court highly probative and is corroborated in part, it becomes ad-
missible, and is by the same token immune to confrontation clause
challenge.' "




41. See Brief of Appellant at 21.
42. 206 Neb. at 252, 292 N.W.2d at 305.
43. Id. at 253, 292 N.W.2d at 305.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 254, 292 N.W.2d at 305.
47. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2)(e) (Reissue 1979).
48. 206 Neb. at 255, 292 N.W.2d at 306 (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN's EVIDENCE 804-129 (1979)).
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In reference to the statements made by the decedent to Attor-
ney Rau concerning her husband's physical abuse and her desire
to obtain a divorce, the court first examined the decedent's possi-
ble motives for fabrication.4 9 The court found that since the con-
versation took place during the course of a professional
consultation between attorney and client, it was reasonable to as-
sume that an accurate statement of the facts had been given by the
decedent.50 As the court stated: "There was no apparent reason to
falsify any statement and ample reasons for accuracy and truthful-
ness."5 1 The truth of the decedent's statements was also bolstered
by a photograph of decedent's bruises which had been taken by
the attorney and admitted into evidence at trial.52 The court con-
cluded that "[t] he evidence of all the surrounding circumstances
tends to corroborate the veracity of the declarant's statements and
to indicate the absence of incentives to speak falsely."53
The court reached a similar conclusion concerning the dece-
dent's statements to the deputy sheriff relating the beating by her
husband. Corroboration for these hearsay statements was found
in evidence showing that the declarant was emotionally upset
when the deputy sheriff found her alone in the church parking lot,
was afraid to return home, and spent the night in a motel.54
The court held that the hearsay statements made to these two
witnesses were admissible and stated:
We believe the statements of the decedent made to her attorney and
the statements made to the deputy sheriff; under the circumstances out-
lined by the evidence here, had substantial guarantees of trustworthiness
equivalent to the guarantees of trustworthiness of some of the other spe-
cific hearsay exceptions. The trial court has broad powers of discretion in
weighing and balancing the probative value of such evidence and the pos-
sible prejudice, and the statements were admissible under the provisions
of § 27-804(2) (3).55
The court reached a contrary conclusion with respect to the
hearsay statements made by the decedent to her friend and co-
worker.56 The court emphasized that there was no evidence of cor-




53. Id. The court assumed that Ms. Rau's testimony accurately reflected what
took place during her meeting with the decedent due to the attorney's disin-
terested status and her having heard the statements while acting in the
course of her professional employment.
54. Id. at 255, 292 N.W.2d at 306. As with the attorney's testimony, the court as-
sumed that Mr. Barnes' law enforcement training and the fact that the state-
ments were made only two days prior to the shooting gave assurance as to
the sheriffs testimonial capabilities.
55. Id. at 255-56, 292 N.W.2d at 306.
56. Id. at 256, 292 N.W.2d at 30607.
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roboration nor of any relevant factors surrounding the making of
the statements which might establish guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. 57 As a result, the testimony of Ellen Prirneau was not admis-
sible under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Nevertheless, the court held that the error was not prejudicial due
to the merely cumulative nature of the testimony.5
8
M. ANALYSIS
At common law, it was presumed that all hearsay testimony
should be inadmissible.59 This presumption proved to be unwork-
able because it often excluded material evidence which presented
little danger of inaccuracy or untrustworthiness. 60 As a result, the
common law courts created various exceptions in order to admit
hearsay testimony deemed reliable due to the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the hearsay statements. 61 While this sys-
tem of specific hearsay exceptions was effective in many instances,
reliable and much-needed evidence often was not admitted be-
cause it did not fall within any of the specific categories, and unre-
liable testimony frequently was admitted simply because it fell
within a recognized hearsay exception.62
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For a list and discussion of the common law cases, see 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, § 1364. Well-known judges have spoken of the intrinsic weakness of
hearsay evidence. Chief Justice Marshall, in Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 290 (1813), stated:
That this species of testimony supposes some better testimony
which might be adduced in the particular case is not the sole ground
of its exclusion. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy
the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be
practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay
evidence is totally inadmissible.
Id. at 295-96. This view was echoed by Justice Story in Ellicott v. Pearl, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 412 (1836). Justice Story stated that hearsay evidence has been
excluded for the reasons that it is not upon oath, that parties affected have no
opportunity for cross-examination, "that it is peculiarly liable to be obtained
by fraudulent contrivances, and above all that it is exceedingly infirm, unsat-
isfactory, and intrinsically weak in its very nature and character." Id. at 436.
60. See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1420-1427. Professor Wigmore
stated: '"The purpose and reason of the hearsay rule is the key to the excep-
tions to it." Id. § 1420, at 251. When it was shown that hearsay testimony did
not offend the policies supporting the hearsay rule, the main one being the
absence of cross-examination, it no longer made sense to exclude such evi-
dence. Consequently, as inherently reliable hearsay was presented to the
common law courts, specific hearsay exceptions were established. Id. § 1420,
at 251-52.
61. For a discussion of the development of the exceptions, see 5 J. WiGmoRE,
supra note 2, § 1420, at 251-52.
62. The point has been made by many commentators that often the traditional
[Vol. 61:187
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To alleviate the problem of exclusion of reliable evidence when
not within a specific exception, the Federal Rules of Evidence ad-
ded the residual exceptions in the codification of the traditional
common law exceptions. 63 However, the common law policy of ad-
mitting hearsay testimony only when shown to be inherently relia-
ble was preserved. This is indicated by the explicit statutory
prerequisites for admissibility of hearsay under the residual ex-
ceptions and by the legislative history, which calls for their imple-
mentation "only in exceptional circumstances."6 4
The Federal Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay provi-
sions, represent an attempt to codify federal evidence law while
leaving the trial judge sufficient discretion to administer justice in
exceptional cases. 65 Any increase in discretion afforded the trial
judge would naturally run counter to the purpose of the Federal
Rules to promote uniformity in evidentiary rulings.66 Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial court's discre-
hearsay rule, along with its exceptions, operates to exclude the more reliable
and admit the less reliable evidence. In short, much evidence routinely ad-
mitted under a recognized exception is simply not too trustworthy. See, e.g.,
E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAw 229 (5th
ed. 1976); J. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 206 (10th ed. 1973).
63. The Advisory Committee's Note to FED. RULE 803(24) explains the addition of
the residual exceptions as follows:
The preceding 23 exceptions of Rule 803 and the first five [four] ex-
ceptions of Rule 804(b), infra, are designed to take full advantage of
the accumulated wisdom and experience of the past in dealing with
hearsay. It would, however, be presumptuous to assume that all pos-
sible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued
and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed sys-
tem. Exception (24) and its companion provision in rule
804(b) (6) [5] are accordingly included.
FED. R. EviD. 803(24), Advisory Committee Note, reprinted in FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 136 (1979). See S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7065 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
64. SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 20.
65. See Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L REV. 239 (1978). During the debate
over the residual exceptions, Representative Holtzman asserted that the law
of evidence could not be effectively codified. Holtzman stated:
The problems with rule 803 (24) illustrate the serious reservations
I have about codification of rules of evidence. This provision recog-
nizes that it is impossible to codify the hearsay exceptions. Instead
of permitting, by statute, any kind of hearsay to be used, we ought to
have allowed courts to develop evidentiary principles on a case-by-
case basis-as they have done for 200 years of our Federal history.
120 CONG. REC. 40,892-93 (1974), reprinted in ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON CONTIN-
UING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, RESOURCE MATERIALs-FEDERAL RUiS OF
EVIDENCE 385.
66. See generally J. Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federal
Courts, 24 F.R.D. 331 (1960); T. Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tionary power to create new hearsay exceptions was recognized at
common law.67 This discretion provided the impetus for the Fed-
eral Rules' enumeration of specific exceptions.68 However, judges
usually were hesitant to recognize a general catch-all provision for
reliable hearsay evidence which did not fall within any defined
exception.
The residual exceptions in the Nebraska statutes and Federal
Rules are based upon considerations closely resembling Wig-
more's two-pronged analysis of hearsay admissibility.69 Professor
Wigmore contended that all hearsay exceptions were based on the
principles of (1) necessity and (2) circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness.70 Using this analysis, several courts implemented
a residual-type exception prior to the enactment of the Federal
Rules.71 In applauding this so-called "sensible" approach, Judge
Wisdom, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
stated that there is no legal "canon against the exercise of common
sense in deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence."72
After the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts
and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal
Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962).
67. The specific hearsay exceptions enumerated in the Federal Rules resulted
from judicial decisions which recognized that the situations in which the
hearsay arose guaranteed reliable evidence. One example is the Texas
courts' creation of the exception for present sense impressions. See Ander-
son v. State, 454 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Claybrook v. Acreman, 373
S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161
S.W.2d 474 (1942). See generally C. McCoamncK, supra note 2, §§ 254-324; 5 & 6
J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1420-1792.
68. See generally C. McCoRMcCK, supra note 2, §§ 244-248; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, §§ 1360-1364; Note, The Federal Courts and the Catchall Hearsay Ex-
ceptions, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1361, 1362 (1979).
69. See 5 J. WiGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1420-1423.
70. Id.
71. See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971); Butler v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 431 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134
(10th Cir. 1969); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d
388 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
72. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir.
1961). Dallas County set the trend for federal courts to admit hearsay evi-
dence in the absence of an established common law exception. Dallas
County, Alabama, insured its courthouse against damages occurring as a re-
sult of lightning or fire. The courthouse was damaged by the collapse of its
clock tower; the county claimed that the collapse was caused by a bolt of
lightning and filed suit to collect on its insurance policy. The insurance com-
pany introduced hearsay evidence, in the form of a 56-year old newspaper
clipping, that the charred remains inside the clocktower debris were the re-
sult of an old fire instead of lightning. Although the newspaper clipping did
not fit into any of the established common law hearsay exceptions, the Fifth
Circuit held that since the clipping was necessary, trustworthy, relevant and
material, it should be admitted as evidence. Dallas County is cited in SENATE
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initially tended to use the residual exceptions solely to bolster the
admittance of evidence on the grounds of other hearsay excep-
tions.73 This situation has changed, and contrary to the prediction
of one commentator,74 there have been numerous decisions inter-
preting the residual exceptions.7 However, the courts have varied
REPORT, supra note 63, at 19, and served as an example of when the proposed
residual exceptions should apply.
73. See Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.
1975), where the Fifth Circuit admitted FAA standards as evidence of norma-
tive airport procedures under the hearsay exception for official national
safety codes. The court determined that the standards were prepared by a
neutral party interested only in safety. Id. at 1182. Judge Wisdom, who also
wrote the Dallas County opinion, see note 72 supra, found additional support
in the not yet effective residual exceptions and described the Federal Rules
of Evidence as "[t] he most enlightened views on the law of evidence." Id. at
1184. And in Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976),
a hydrological survey prepared by government experts was admitted into evi-
dence under a liberal interpretation of the shopbook hearsay exception. The
trial judge refused to sustain plaintiff's objections to the study as hearsay. Id.
at 1386. The judge found that the survey had sufficient guarantees of reliabil-
ity to warrant admission pursuant to a judge's discretion to admit "hearsay
found to be the best evidence reasonably available and to have assurances of
accuracy and reliability." Id. at 1386-87. The judge remarked that this
residual discretion had been codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at
1387. The trial judge's recommended decision was adopted by the court of
claims as the basis for judgment See also United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d
431, 435 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1977) in which the Ninth
Circuit found that the admission at trial of the hearsay testimony of an in-
formant was harmless error. The court remarked that the government had
made no attempt to admit the informant's testimony under the residual ex-
ceptions, id. at 437, but had instead relied on the seldom used predisposition
to commit the crime hearsay exception. Id. The court rejected the use of
such an exception. Id.
74. See Waltz, Rule 803-Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immate-
rial, in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL MATIERS 13, 41 (1977);
Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New Day
for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LITGATION, Fall 1975, at 22. Waltz predicted that the
residual exceptions would only be implemented in extremely rare situations,
and as a result, would have a minimal effect on federal evidence law. Waltz,
FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMNAL MATTERS, supra, at 41.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1980); Fong v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weisman, 624
F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Atkins,
618 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 992 (1980); Huff v. White Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
1979); United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
821 (1980); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1045 (1980); United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978);
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Gonzalez,
559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.
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considerably on the scope which is afforded the residual excep-
tions, and two main schools of thought have emerged with respect
to the appropriate breadth of the provisions.
76
One view is that the residual exceptions should be construed
narrowly in accordance with the legislative intent that they be
used "only in exceptional circumstances." 77 In 1972, the United
States Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
submitted its revised draft of the proposed rules of evidence78 to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court approved the proposed
rules in November 1972,79 but Congress deferred the effective date
of the rules pending congressional confirmation.
80
The House acted first on the Rules, and its Judiciary Committee
recommended deleting the residual hearsay exceptions.8 1 The
committee cited two reasons for its recommendation. 82 First, the
exceptions were criticized as "injecting too much uncertainty into
the law of evidence and impairing the ability of practitioners to
1977); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Gomez, 529 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975).
76. In the following decisions, the courts held that the residual exceptions should
be construed narrowly and that the evidence to be admitted must be inher-
ently trustworthy: United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Gonzales, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1977); Lowery v. Maryland,
401 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1975).
In contrast, the trustworthiness requirement was relaxed in Furtado v.
Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); United
States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978);
United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977).
77. SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 20.
78. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). Both residual exceptions defined as admis-
sible hearsay "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." Id. at 422.
79. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.RD. 183
(1972).
80. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See I-L. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7051, 7075 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].




prepare for trial."83 Second, it was believed that Rule 102, directing
"the courts to construe the Rules of Evidence so as to promote
'growth and development,' "84 would provide the trial judge with
sufficient flexibility to admit hearsay evidence in appropriate cir-
cumstances, without a recognized exception.85 The House subse-
quently deleted the two residual provisions in its version of the
Rules.86
While the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed that the
Supreme Court version was too broad,87 it was opposed to the
House's deletion of the residual exceptions.88 In explaining its po-
sition, the committee stressed two primary considerations. First, it
feared that without separate residual exceptions, trial court judges
would use Rule 102 to interpret the specific enumerated hearsay
exceptions beyond recognition.89 Second, the committee believed
that the enumerated exceptions could not possibly encompass
every situation in which hearsay testimony was reliable.9 0 As a
result, the Senate reinstated the residual exceptions; however,
they were narrower than those proposed by the Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee.91 Furthermore, the committee emphasized
that the provisions were to be utilized "very rarely."
92
83. Id.
84. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 80, at 5-6 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 102).
85. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 80, at 5-6. FED. R. EvD. 102 provides: 'These rules
shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjus-
tifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined."
86. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2215.




91. The Senate version of the residual exceptions provided as follows:
Other Exceptions-A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable ef-
forts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7106 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. The
Senate version was later enacted by Congress after a notice requirement was
added to the provisions by a conference committee. See notes 93-94 & accom-
panying text infra.
92. SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 20. In outlining the desired scope of the
exceptions, the Senate Report stated:
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The Rules were referred to a conference committee to resolve
the conflict between the House and Senate over the residual ex-
ceptions. The conference committee adopted the Senate version,
but added a provision for pretrial notice to the adverse party re-
garding the intended use of the hearsay testimony.93 Congress ul-
timately adopted the conference committee's recommendation and
enacted the residual exceptions in their present form.94
The residual exceptions adopted by the Nebraska legislature
follow nearly verbatim their counterparts in the Federal Rules.
The legislative history of the Nebraska Rules of Evidence reveals
that this identity of language manifests an intent by the Nebraska
legislature to adopt the policy considerations underlying the
residual exceptions as enacted by Congress.95
In light of the congressional legislative history, the narrow
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used
very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee
does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit
hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other excep-
tions contained in rules 803 and 804(b). The residual exceptions are
not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule,
including its present exceptions. Such major revisions are best ac-
complished by legislative actions. It is intended that in any case in
which evidence is sought to be admitted under these subsections, the
trial judge will exercise no less care, reflection and caution than the
courts did under the common law in establishing the now-recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Id.
93. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 91, at 4.
94. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926. For the text of the
provisions, see note 1 supra, which sets forth the nearly identical Nebraska
residual exceptions.
95. The Nebraska Supreme Court Committee on Practice and Procedure was es-
tablished in 1969 and was charged to "undertake a study of modernized and
simplified rules of evidence for consideration by bench and bar and... to
transmit its recommendations to the Supreme Court." THE NEBRASKA
SUPREME COURT COMMITrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED NE-
BRASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE 5 (1973). This study was done "in connection
with a group of proposals being submitted to the Congress... by the [United
States] Supreme Court." Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence: Hearings on
LB 279 Before the Judiciary Comm. of the Nebraska Unicameral, 84th Legis.,
1st Sess. 1 (1975) (statement of David Dow).
The initial draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence was utilized by
the state committee as a foundation for its study, and the Nebraska "pro-
posed rules follow[ed] in many respects the Proposed Federal Code." PRO-
POSED NEBRASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra. When the Nebraska and
Federal Rules were consistent in substance, the committee "attempted to
conform the language of the Nebraska Rule to the Proposed Federal Rule."
Id. This attempt toward uniformity continued throughout the period of revi-
sion. As the Nebraska legislative history reveals:
When the final Federal Rules were adopted by the House and Sen-
ate, the Committee had further meetings to try and revise [the Ne-
braska] rules so... the State and Federal rules would be the same
[Vol. 61:187
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scope afforded the residual exceptions by a minority of authorities
would seem to correctly reflect the intent of Congress in enacting
the exceptions. The residual exceptions were passed by the House
only after Senate assurance that the exceptions were to be used
"very rarely"96 and "only in exceptional circumstances."9 7 The
Senate Report also placed emphasis on Dallas County v. Commer-
cial Union Assurance Co.,98 in which the extremely unusual facts
surrounding the hearsay evidence were held to guarantee the
trustworthiness of the statements and made it "inconceivable"
that the hearsay was fabricated.99
While many courts have given lip service to the apparent desire
of Congress to limit the application of the residual exceptions, in
practice these courts have relaxed and modified the trustworthi-
ness requirement to a great degree.00 A majority of courts and
in language if they were the same in purpose and there was no policy
difference. This was done.
Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence: Hearings on LB 279 Before the Judici-
ary Comm. of the Nebraska Unicamera4 supra.
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 20.
97. Id.
98. 285 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
99. SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 19.
100. See United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
986 (1977); United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 850 (1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976).
In these decisions, the courts found evidence admissible under the residual
exceptions and based their rulings on circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness. Nevertheless, upon examination is it apparent that the admitted
hearsay lacked any degree of trustworthiness. Furthermore, the courts did
not address the circumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay state-
ments which clearly diminished the reliability of the hearsay testimony.
Medico involved a bank robbery and a bank employee's description of the
getaway car. About five minutes after the robbery occurred, the bank em-
ployee heard a regular customer of the bank pounding on the entrance door
and shouting out a description of the car. The bank employee quickly wrote
down this description. The customer had been given the description by an
unidentified young man sitting in a car parked outside the bank. In affirming
the admission of the double hearsay evidence under Rule 804(b) (5), the Sec-
ond Circuit upheld Judge Weinstein's finding that the evidence was trustwor-
thy. 557 F.2d at 315. The majority rejected the dissent's arguments that the
excitement may have made the customer's perception faulty. Id. at 316. In
addition, it found that although the rest of the evidence raised suspicions re-
garding the ownership of the getaway car, these suspicions were not dis-
turbing enough to make the description untrustworthy. Id.
In Leslie, the defendant was convicted of transporting a stolen automobile
between states and subsequently selling it. The defendant was one of the
four men arrested with the stolen vehicle. At the time of the arrest, the other
three men made statements indicating that the defendant was the ringleader
of the scheme. At trial, the government introduced the statements to im-
peach the credibility of the three men, who claimed that their earlier state-
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legal scholars have either expressly'O' or covertly'0 2 advocated a
liberal interpretation of the residual exceptions. Several argu-
ments have been advanced to support this position. First, it has
been reasoned that the language of the statutes themselves should
be afforded greater emphasis than the various congressional re-
ports. 03 Second, it has been argued that a broad interpretation
would be more consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
whole. 0 4 Third, since many of the specific hearsay exceptions of-
ments were not true. The men explained that they had been under the
influence of drugs when they made the statements and had been led to be-
lieve that they would receive a lesser charge if they made the statements to
the F.BJ. Despite this inconsistency, the court of appeals admitted the testi-
mony as substantive evidence under Rule 803(24). 542 F.2d at 291. The most
dangerous aspect of this decision was the court's disregard of the fact that the
initial statements of the three men were self-serving and were a possible
frame-up of the defendant. It is difficult to see how the later admission by the
men that they actually made the statements diminishes this danger.
In Ward, the defendants were convicted of stealing and disposing of a
truck in interstate commerce. The driver of the truck, who was unavailable to
testify at the trial because he was a fugitive on an unrelated state charge, had
told the F.B.L that he was sleeping at a truck stop when the truck was stolen.
His statement was admitted under Rule 804(b) (5), despite the possibility
that it was made solely to cover up his own participation in the theft. 552 F.2d
at 1083. The court acknowledged that the statement might have been self-
serving, but found that this possibility was not enough to violate the Rule
804(b) (5) trustworthiness requirement. Id.
In Carbson, the declarant was the government's chief witness. He testified
before a grand jury that he purchased cocaine from the defendant and dis-
tributed it to a third conspirator, who then sold the cocaine to a government
agent. The night before the trial began, the declarant decided not to testify.
The declarant's only explanation for his decision was a vague fear of reprisals
from the defendant. In admitting the grand jury testimony under Rule
804(b) (5), 547 F.2d at 1354, the court neglected to consider the suspicious na-
ture of the declarant's refusal to testify. Clearly, there was little reason for
the declarant to be so vague and secretive since greater specificity would
have made him more credible. It is possible that the real reason for the de-
clarant's decision was that his earlier statements were not true and were
made in order to spread the guilt or protect an unnamed party. In any event,
the circumstances surrounding the declarant's sudden refusal to testify
should have been considered in determining the trustworthiness of his
statements.
101. See Imwinkelried, supra note 65; Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay: The
Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 11 Tax. TEcH. L. REv. 587 (1980).
102. See note 100 supra.
103. See Inwinkelried, supra note 65, at 258-61.
104. Id. at 261. Numerous commentators have stressed that the underlying theme
of Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to liberalize federal hear-
say practice. Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Hear-
say Rule, 8 Vm. U.L. REv. 261 (1974); Stewart, Perception, Memory and
Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1970); Comment, A Practitioner's Guide to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. RaV. 169 (1975).
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fer only scant assurance of trustworthiness, it has been suggested
that the circumstances supporting the admission of evidence
under the residual exceptions also need not be extensive. 05 Fi-
nally, it has been urged that the Senate's limiting language was
included only to appease the House, and therefore such language
does not represent the true intent of Congress.106
It would appear that the language of the residual exceptions
could be at odds with the supporting legislative history in regard to
the appropriate scope which should be afforded the provisions.
While the legislative history indicates that the provisions should
be rarely used, 07 there is no limiting language in the statute be-
yond the five findings the trial court must make.108 Nevertheless,
since Congress explicitly intended to limit the use of the residual
exceptions, trial courts should strictly construe the five findings
prior to admitting hearsay testimony under the exceptions to as-
sure that only extremely reliable evidence is admitted. Courts
which give mere lip service to the limiting nature of the statute are
acting contrary to the intent of Congress.109
In addition to the controversy over the appropriate scope which
should be given the residuaLexceptions, disagreement exists as to
what factors should be used to determine whether circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness exist. Some courts have focused al-
most entirely on the element of corroboration for such proofl110
others have held that the declarant's motivation in making the
statement should be the sole consideration."'
Neither approach alone is adequate to fully assess the possible
guarantees of trustworthiness." 2 Weinstein has long advocated an
examination of all "the other evidence in the case""1l to determine
the credibility of the extra-judicial declarant. Courts and commen-
105. See Yasser, supra note 101, at 608.
106. Imwinkelried, supra note 65 at 259.
107. See note 92 supra.
108. See notes 5-10 & accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 77-99 & accompanying text supra.
110. See United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); United
States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850 (1977);
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
111. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Fredericks, 599 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp.
194 (E.D. Mich. 1978); State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182 (1978); John-
stone v. State, 548 P.2d 1362 (Nev. 1976).
112. See United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Tur-
ner, 475 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Mich. 1978); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57
(N.D. Ga. 1979); Note, supra note 68, at 1378. For a discussion of Bailey and
its rejection of a single-factor analysis of guarantees of trustworthiness, see
notes 124-28 & accompanying text infra.
113. See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 333 (1961).
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tators have emphasized that an examination of the following fac-
tors is necessary to determine the applicability of the residual
exceptions: (1) the declarant's motivation in making the state-
ment,114 (2) corroboration," 5 (3) circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement,"16 and (4) the declarant's availability for
cross-examination."
7
In Beam, the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized the appar-
ent corroboration of the hearsay declarations made by the dece-
dent to the attorney and deputy sheriff." 8 The decedent's
motivation in making the statements was seemingly given little
weight in the court's determination of "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness,"" 9 other than the court's statement that
"[t] here was no apparent reason to falsify any statement and am-
ple reasons for accuracy and truthfulness.' 1 20 In regard to the con-
versation between the decedent and her attorney, the court
thought it "reasonable to assume that an accurate statement of the
facts"121 was given to attorney Rau by the decedent, because their
conversation took place during the course of a professional consul-
tation. While complete honesty between attorney and client is a
laudable goal, it is questionable whether a client always gives an
impartial and accurate statement of the facts to an attorney during
an initial consultation. 22 This may be especially true in the area
of domestic relations where animosity has developed between the
parties. The court also failed to address the decedent's possible
motivation in making her statements to the deputy sheriff. The de-
cedent was found alone in a parking lot and it does not take a vivid
imagination to construct a scenario in which the decedent would
have been tempted to fabricate a story to the law enforcement offi-
cial. It is questionable whether an analysis which focuses almost
entirely on the hearsay's corroboration is compatible with the leg-
islative mandate calling for use of the exceptions "only in excep-
114. See Note, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in the Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Critical Examination, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 687, 699-70 (1978);
Note, supra note 68.
115. Note, RUTGERS I REV., supra note 114, at 670.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 206 Neb. at 254-55, 292 N.W.2d at 306.
119. Id. at 254, 292 N.W.2d at 306.
120. Id. This observation was made with respect to decedent's statements to At-
torney Rau. As to the decedent's statements to the sheriff, the court merely
noted that "the evidence tends to corroborate ... the absence of incentives
to speak falsely." Id. at 255, 292 N.W.2d at 306.
121. Id. at 254, 292 N.W.2d at 306.
122. See Workman v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 68 F.R.D. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1975). But





Several courts have warned of the danger in using corrobora-
tion as the sole indicator of hearsay reliability. 24 In United States
v. Bailey, 25 the court stated that because of the general purpose of
the residual provisions, 26 "[w] e do not feel that the trustworthi-
ness of a statement offered pursuant to the [residual exceptions]
should be analyzed solely on the basis of the facts corroborating
the authenticity of the statement." 27 In advocating a broader
analysis, the court stated.
[T] he trustworthiness of a statement should be analyzed by evaluating
not only the facts corroborating the veracity of the statement, but also the
circumstances in which the declarant made the statement and the incen-
tive he had to speak truthfully or falsely. Further consideration should be
given to factors bearing on the reliability of the reporting of the hearsay by
the witness.
128
This broad analysis is even more desirable in the criminal context
where added assurances of reliability should be required to avoid
confrontation clause challenge.
29
While the Nebraska Supreme Court may have placed too little
emphasis on the declarant's motivation in Beam, it would appear
that the court has generally implemented the residual exceptions
in an admirable manner. The court has indicated that the five con-
ditions contained in the residual exceptions must be satisfied prior
to the admission of evidence pursuant to those provisions. 30 This
stance is much more compatible with the spirit of the residual ex-
ceptions' 3' than is the practice of those courts which have given
little credence to the conditions precedent to the use of the excep-
tions.132 The Nebraska court's stance would also free the court
123. SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 20. See notes 77-99 & accompanying text
supra.
124. See United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194, 201 (E.D. Mich. 1978); United States v. Thevis, 84
F.R.D. 57, 63 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
125. 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978).
126. The court reasoned that because the residual exceptions were designed to
admit hearsay when circumstances required such evidence to establish the
truth, it would be illogical to rule on admissibility based on corroborating evi-
dence because the existence of a great deal of corroboration negates the need
for such hearsay via the residual exceptions. Id. at 349.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See generally Note, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 Prrr. L. REv. 609
(1974).
130. See State v. Beam, 206 Neb. 248,253-56,292 N.W.2d 302, 305-06 (1980). See also
State v. Leisy, 207 Neb. 118,295 N.W.2d 715 (1980); State v. Reed, 201 Neb. 800,
272 N.W.2d 759 (1978). For a discussion of the five conditions, see notes 5-10 &
accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 77-99 & accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 100-06 & accompanying text supra.
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from the burden of defining "circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness," by excluding hearsay testimony unable to meet the
other conditions precedent prior to the court's determination of
the trustworthiness factor.133
Because Beam and State v. Reed134 are the only cases in which
the Nebraska Supreme Court has addressed the issue of "circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness," it is difficult to predict fu-
ture developments in regard to the residual exceptions. It would
appear that the court will afford great weight to the overall circum-
stances surrounding the making of the hearsay statements to de-
termine if there exist the required guarantees of trustworthiness.
The court apparently adopted that approach in Beam when it
stated: "The evidence of all the surrounding circumstances tends
to corroborate the veracity of the declarant's statements and to in-
dicate the absence of incentives to speak falsely."13 5 Reed also in-
dicates that the court may tend to view the big picture rather than
to focus on the specific elements of corroboration or the particular
motives to falsify.136 However, the Beam court perhaps placed un-
due emphasis on "who" the hearsay statements were communi-
cated to in determining reliability.137 It is questionable whether
statements made to persons in authority or to those in the per-
formance of their professional duties are any more trustworthy
than other hearsay evidence presented before the trial court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In admitting hearsay evidence under the residual exceptions,
courts should be sensitive to the congressional intent to limit the
use of the exceptions to "exceptional circumstances."138 Only by
strictly applying the five conditions of admissibility under the
residual exceptions and rigorously scrutinizing the "circumstantial
133. See State v. Leisy, 207 Neb. 118, 295 N.W.2d 715 (1980), in which the Nebraska
Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness because it found that the mandatory notice requirement had
not been satisfied. Id. at 129-30, 295 N.W.2d at 723. In State v. Reed, 201 Neb.
800, 272 N.W.2d 759 (1978), the court ruled on the issue of circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness, but could have reached the same conclusion with-
out such a determination due to the defendant's failure to meet the other
conditions contained in the residual exceptions. Id. at 807, 272 N.W.2d at 763.
134. 201 Neb. 800, 272 N.W.2d 759 (1978). See note 14 supra.
135. 206 Neb. at 254, 292 N.W.2d at 306.
136. 201 Neb. at 807, 272 N.W.2d at 763.
137. See notes 50-55 & accompanying text supra.




guarantees of trustworthiness"'139 of the hearsay evidence will
courts preserve that intent and further the appropriate use of hiear-
say evidence.
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139. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-803(22), -804(2) (e) (Reissue 1979).
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